

Future of AI, Safety & Security 人工智能、安全和防御的未来



Dr. Roman. Yampolskiy@louisville.edu

Computer Engineering and Computer Science University of Louisville - cecs.louisville.edu/ry Director - CyberSecurity Lab





/roman.yampolskiy

Artificial Intelligence is Here ...















Robots are Here ...

















SuperIntelligence is Coming ...

超级智能即将来临

Conference Series On

Artificial General Intelligence


















SuperSoon 超级临近



@romanyam






SuperSmart 超级聪明



Google DeepMind

















SuperComplex 超级复杂






"飞机操作 人员或飞行 员中很少有 人了解那部 分软件。"


SuperFast 超级快速





Ultrafast Extreme Events (UEEs)





Abrupt Rise of New Machine Ecology **Beyond Human Response Time**. By Johnson et al. Nature. Scientific Reports 3, #2627 (2013)

SuperControlling 超级控制



能源:核电站 Energy: Nuclear Power Plants



公共事业:水厂/电网 **Utilities:** Water Plants/Electrical Grid

DAO



军事:核武器 **Military:** Nuclear Weapons



Communications: Satellites



股市: 75%以上的交易订单由自动交易系统产生

Stock Market: 75+% of all trade orders generated by Automated Trading Systems

航空:不间断自动巡航系统

Aviation: Uninterruptible Autopilot System

SuperViruses

超级病毒








Table. Adversarial Technology Examples

| Adversarial Technology | Year | Financial Impact | Users Affected | Transmit Vector |
|------------------------|------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| "I Love You" | 2000 | \$15 billion | 500,000 | Emailed itself to user contacts after opened |
| "Code Red" | 2001 | \$2.6 billion | 1 million | Scanned Internet for Microsoft computers— attacked 100 IP addresses at a time |
| "My Doom" | 2004 | \$38 billion | 2 million | Emailed itself to user contacts after opened |
| Stuxnet | 2010 | Unknown | Unclear | Attacked industrial control systems |
| "Heartbleed" | 2014 | Estimated tens of millions | Estimated at 2/3 of all Web servers | Open Secure Sockets Layer flaw exposes user data |

Sources: "Top 5 Computer Viruses of All Time," UKNorton.com, available at < http://uk.norton.com/top-5-viruses/promo>; "Update 1—Researchers Say Stuxnet Was Deployed Against Iran in 2007," Reuters, February 26, 2013, available at <www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/26/cyberwar-stuxnet-idUSL1N0BQ5ZW20130226>; Jim Finkle, "Big Tech Companies Offer Millions after Heartbleed Crisis," Reuters, April 24, 2014, available at <www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/24/us-cybercrime-heartbleed-idUSBREA3N13E20140424>.

Relying on Kindness of Machines? **The Security Threat of Artificial Agents.**By Randy Eshelman and Douglas Derrick. JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015.

Positive Impacts of SuperIntelligence 超级智能带来的积极影响







Knowledge

| | | , , |
|---------|---------|----------|
| υ | Knowns | Unknowns |
| owledg | known | known |
| known | Knowns | Unknowns |
| letakn | unknown | unknown |
| www.nkn | Knowns | Unknowns |

Negative Impacts of SuperIntelligence 超级智能带来的一些问题








Types of risk

Type of knowledge



<u>@romanyam</u>

roman.yampolskiy@louisville.edu

"I think we

very careful

intelligence"

我认为我们应该

should be

about

artificial



"... there's some prudence in thinking about benchmarks that would indicate some general intelligence developing on the horizon."

Concerns About A(G)I 关于人工智能的担忧

"I am in the

camp that is

about super


intelligence"

我属于对超级智能

抱有担忧的一群人

concerned

"...eventually they'll think faster than us






Taxonomy of Pathways to Dangerous Al 通往危险的人工智能的路径分类学


| How and When did AI become | | External Causes | | | Internal Causes |
|----------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|--------------------|
|] | Dangerous | On Purpose | By Mistake | Environment | Independently |
| ing | Pre- Deployment | a | С | e | g |
| Timing | Post- Deployment | Ъ | d | f | h |

Roman V. Yampolskiy. Taxonomy of Pathways to Dangerous Artificial Intelligence. 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2016). 2nd International Workshop on AI, Ethics and Society (AIEthicsSociety2016). Phoenix, Arizona, USA. February 12-13th, 2016.


- **Deliberate actions** of not-so-ethical people (on purpose -a, b)
 - Hackers, criminals, military, corporations, governments, cults, psychopaths, etc.
- Side effects of poor design (engineering mistakes -c, d)
 - Bugs, misaligned values, bad data, wrong goals, etc.
- **Miscellaneous** cases, impact of the surroundings of the system (environment -e, f)
 - Soft errors, SETI
- Runaway self-improvement process (Independently -g, h)
 - Wireheading, Emergent Phenomena, "Treacherous Turn"
- 故意设计的危险AI同样有可能保护所有其他类型的安全问题,并将产生直接后果。它是最危险的AI,也最难防御。


1/






SuperBooks 超级图书







SuperResponse 超级响应













Moral Responsibility for Computing Artifacts





Future of Humanity Institute

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD




CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF EXISTENTIAL RISK UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE





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Mitigating Negative Impact 缓解负面影响




Kaj Sotala and **Roman V. Yampolskiy**. Physica Scripta 90 (1)

http://iopscience.iop.org/1402-4896/90/1/018001/article

| Category | Methodology | Investigated by | Year |
|---------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|------|
| Prevention of | Fight Scientists | Ted Kaczynski | 1995 |
| Development | Outlaw Research | Bill Joy | 2000 |
| | Restrict Hardware | Anthony Berglas | 2009 |
| | Singularity Steward | Ben Goertzel | 2004 |
| Restricted | AI-Boxing | Eric Drexler, Eliezer Yudkowsky | 2002 |
| Deployment | Leakproofing | David Chalmers | 2010 |
| | Oracle AI | Nick Bostrom | 2008 |
| | AI-Confinement | Roman V. Yampolskiy | 2011 |
| Incorporation | Economic | Robin Hanson | 2008 |
| into Society | Legal | H. Moravec, R. Hanson, S. Omohundro | 2007 |
| | Religious | Robert Geraci | 2007 |
| | Ethical/Social | Mark Waser, Joshua Fox, Carl Shulman | 2008 |
| | Moral | J. Storrs Hall | 2000 |
| | Equality | Bill Hibbard | 2005 |
| | Education | David Brin | 1987 |
| Self | Rules to Follow | Isaac Asimov | 1942 |
| Monitoring | Friendly AI | Eliezer Yudkowsky | 2001 |
| | Emotions | Bill Hibbard | 2001 |
| | Chaining | Stuart Armstrong | 2007 |
| | Humane AI | Ben Goertzel | 2004 |
| | Compassionate AI | Tim Freeman | 2009 |
| Other | They Will Need Us | Alan Turing | 1950 |
| Solutions | War Against Machines | Samuel Butler | 1863 |
| | Join Them | Ray Kurzweil, Kewin Warwick | 2003 |
| | Denialism | Jeff Hawkins | 2008 |
| | Do Nothing | Douglas Hofstadter, John Casti | 2008 |
| | Pleasure and Pain | Peter Turney | 1991 |
| | Let them Kill Us | Hugo de Garis, Eric Dietrich | 2005 |
| | Fusion of Man and AI | Peter Turney | 1991 |
| | Reproductive Control | Samuel Butler | 1863 |


Enhance Human Capabilities, Uploads, Neural Lace 增强人的能力、上传、神经织网





Laws of Robotics 机器人法则






Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics

- A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
- A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
- A robot must protect its own existence, as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.



Formal Verification 正式验证






Al Confinement Problem 人工智能的限制问题







| Level | Outputs | Inputs | Explanation |
|-------|-----------|-----------|---|
| 0 | Unlimited | Unlimited | Unlimited communication (Free AI) |
| 1 | Unlimited | Limited | Censored input, uncensored output |
| 2 | Unlimited | None | Outputs only with no inputs |
| 3 | Limited | Unlimited | Unlimited input and censored output |
| 4 | Limited | Limited | Secured communication (proposed protocol) |
| 5 | Limited | None | Censored output and no inputs |
| 6 | None | Unlimited | Inputs only with no outputs |
| 7 | None | Limited | Censored input and no outputs |
| 8 | None | None | No communication, fully confined AI |

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Conclusions 结论

The timeline of AI Failures has an exponential trend:


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1959 AI designed to be a General Problem Solver failed to solve real world problems.<sup>1</sup>
1982 Software designed to make discoveries, discovered how to cheat instead.<sup>2</sup>
1983 Nuclear attack early warning system falsely claimed that an attack is taking place.<sup>3</sup>
2010 Complex AI stock trading software caused a trillion dollar flash crash.<sup>4</sup>
2011 E-Assistant told to "call me an ambulance" began to refer to the user as Ambulance.<sup>5</sup>
2013 Object recognition neural networks saw phantom objects in particular noise images [1].
2015 Automated email reply generator created inappropriate responses.<sup>6</sup>
2015 A robot for grabbing auto parts grabbed and killed a man.
2015 Image tagging software classified black people as gorillas.8
2015 Medical Expert AI classified patients with asthma as lower risk [2].
2015 Adult content filtering software failed to remove inappropriate content.9
2016 AI designed to predict recidivism acted racist. 10
2016 Game NPCs designed unauthorized superweapons.<sup>11</sup>
2016 Patrol robot collided with a child.<sup>12</sup>
2016 World champion-level Go playing AI lost a game. 13
2016 Self driving car had a deadly accident. 14
2016 AI designed to converse with users on Twitter became verbally abusive.<sup>15</sup>
```

Al failures will grow in <u>frequency and severity</u> proportionate to Al's capability.

人工智能失败的频率和严重程度都会增加,这与人工智能的能力成比例。



References can be found in ... 参考资料



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The End!

Roman. Yampolskiy@louisville.edu

Director, CyberSecurity Lab

Computer Engineering and Computer Science

University of Louisville - cecs.louisville.edu/ry



twitter @romanyam



/Roman.Yampolskiy





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